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pear to be irrelevant to the constitutional issue involved.
Notwithstanding the tenable policy reasons for a reluctance
to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state buyers where there
has been no physical entry into the state by the defendant,
47
the statute in question is clear and unequivocal. It declares
that any foreign corporation which makes a contract with a
resident of Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part in
Minnesota should be subject to the jurisdiction of our state
courts. While it is unquestionably proper for the court to con-
sider the constitutionality of any application of the statute, it
would seem that there is little room for it to indulge in its
conception of good public policy since that question has already
been resolved by the legislature.
Marshall Egg presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with
an excellent opportunity to define the constitutional limits of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign corporations. It is un-
fortunate that the opinion perpetuates the confusion and un-
certainty which have existed in this area. Perhaps the new,
more general jurisdiction statute will give the court an oppor-
tunity to reconsider its position.
Statutes: An Analysis of the innesota
Post Conviction Remedy Statute
In response to encouragement from the federal govern-
ment,1 the Minnesota legislature recently enacted a Post Con-
47. For example, the state does nct want to discourage nonresi-
dents from making purchases. See Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank
v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117-18, 1.17 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1962). It
should be noted, however, that while the possibility of subjecting
itself to the jurisdiction of the state of the seller might deter the casual
purchaser, it is highly doubtful that it would have such an effect on a
corporation doing substantial business with the seller. The very fact
that a corporation continues to make purchases in the state is a positive
indication that it finds some economic advantage in such action.
1. Minutes of the meeting of the Minnesota Senate Committee
on Judiciary, March 2, 1967, in Mnmw. S. Comnvr. oN JuDicwRYa 15
(1967). The encouragement was in the form of an amendment to the
federal Habeas Corpus Act which ensured a degree of finality to state
court findings of fact in criminal proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55
(1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966). It was hoped that the amend-
ment would encourage states to enact post-conviction legislation by as-
suring the state that such a remedy would be accorded a presumption
of adequacy by the federal courts. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1966). See also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965),
which made this encouragement explicit.
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viction Remedy 2 statute. The statute establishes a procedure
whereby a criminal may seek to overturn his conviction on the
grounds that the conviction or his sentence violated rights guar-
anteed to him by the constitution or laws of either the United
States or Minnesota.3 In order to initiate proceedings under this
statute, the criminal defendant must file a petition with the
clerk of the district court in which his conviction took place.
4
If the applicant is without counsel, the clerk of the district
court must send a copy of the petition to the office of the public
defender.5 If the petitioner is indigent and does not waive his
right to counsel the public defender prepares a post-conviction
petition and serves it upon the Attorney General or the local
county attorney.6 The county attorney or the Attorney Gen-
eral has twenty days in which to respond to the petition.
7
Thereafter an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of the
petition is scheduled unless the petition, records, and files con-
clusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.8
Prior to the adoption of the Post Conviction Remedy, Min-
nesota afforded convicted defendants relief by means of a writ
of habeas corpus.9 At least two major problems arose under
this procedure. First, the grant or denial of an evidentiary
hearing was discretionary with the trial judge,10 which led to
inconsistencies in decisions involving summary disposition of
2. MnmN. STAT. §§ 590.01-.06; ch. 336, [1967] Minn. Laws 366.
3. Id. § 590.01(1).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 590.02(1) (4). The purpose of this procedure is to imple-
ment § 590.05 which guarantees representation by counsel to indigents.
Id. § 590.02(3). All defendants may waive their right to counsel.
6. Letter from C. Paul Jones, Minnesota Public Defender, to
Minnesota District Court Judges, Aug. 14, 1967. The statute does not
prescribe the procedure the public defender must use.
7. Mm. STAT. § 590.03; ch. 336, § 3, [1967] Minn. Laws 367.
8. Id. § 590.04.
9. E.g., State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d
161 (1965).
10. State ex rel. Owens v. Tahash, 274 Minn. 201, 143 N.W.2d
(1966). In State ex tel. Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1967),
the court adopted the federal test for granting an evidentiary hear-
ing: such a hearing must be granted if material facts which have not
been determined by the trial court are in dispute and which, if proved,
would entitle the petitioner to relief. The petition in Roy was filed
prior to the effective date of Mum. STAT. §§ 590.01-.06 but after its
adoption by the legislature. Therefore, Roy should not be considered
part of the decisional law antedating §§ 590.01-.06. Rather, it must be
read as a preview interpretation of this statute. This is supported by
the fact that the court, in its syllabus, indicates that the standards it
established for habeas proceedings are applicable to the new law.
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such a petition."' Second, state court findings of fact were sub-
ject to federal review, causing a loss of finality and an imbal-
ance between state and federal courts. 1 2  This federal review
took place pursuant to the federal Habeas Corpus Act 13 which
made post-conviction relief available in the federal courts even
to prisoners convicted under state law.' 4 In Fay v. Noia,1r the
Supreme Court held that a federal judge sitting in a habeas
proceeding was empowered to retry issues of fact already deter-
mined by the convicting state tribunal. In Townsend v. Sain, it
held that the judge was under a mandate to do so if it appeared
that the petitioner had been denied a fair hearing.' 6 The
availability of a second forum, brought about by Noia and Sain,
probably caused the substantial increase in number of applica-
tions for relief under section 2254 o: the Federal Act."7 In 1966
Congress, desiring to reduce the number of petitions filed' s and
11. State ex tel. Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1967)(dictum). Compare State ex rel. Rankin v. Tahash, 149 N.W.2d 12
(Minn. 1967), with State ex rel. Smith v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 168, 136
N.W.2d 617 (1965) and State ex rel. Dinneen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 7,
136 N.W. 2d 847 (1965).
12. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Wright & Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners; The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966); Note, State Criminal Procedure
and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HARV. L. REv. 422 (1966).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 241-55 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966) [here-
inafter cited as FEDERAL ACT].
14. Id. § 2254.
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Although Mr. Justice Brennan took pains
to lay a historical background for Noia pointing out that the federal
courts already possessed the power to review testimony previously con-
sidered by state courts, facts, both in the record and determined at
trial, historically, could not be controverted in a habeas proceeding.
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally
Oaks, Legal History in the High Court Habeas Corpus, 64 MCH. L.
REV. 451, 452-56, 459-68 (1965).
16. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Townsend Court
delineated six standards concerning when the federal court must grant
an evidentiary hearing:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding pro-
cedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313.
17. In 1963, 1,692 applications were filed. In 1964, 3,248; in 1965,
4,845; and in the first nine months of 1966, 3,773 applications were filed.
S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
18. Id. at 2.
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to return a degree of finality to state court proceedings' 19 by
encouraging the formulation of state post-conviction remedies,2"
amended the Federal Act. The amendment of section 2254 pro-
vides, inter alia, that the applicant must exhaust all state reme-
dies before making application under that section. 21 Further-
more, state court findings of fact are to be accorded a pre-
sumption of correctness in federal habeas proceedings.2 2 In re-
sponse to this encouragement and the problems experienced
under previous procedures, 23 the Minnesota Post Conviction Rem-
edy was enacted.
The Minnesota statute, following the Uniform Act,24 guaran-
tees assistance of counsel to indigents at collateral attack pro-
ceedings.25  The statutory procedures designed to safeguard
the right to counsel constitute the most significant contribution
of the Minnesota Act. The petition for relief must contain the
name and address of any attorney representing the petitioner.26
If the petitioner is without counsel and has not waived his right
thereto, the clerk must submit a copy of the petition to the office
of the public defender 27 who will examine the petition, investi-
gate the allegations therein, and, if necessary, redraft it before it
is delivered to the county attorney and the chief judge for
docketing.28 This process encourages communication between
the prosecution and the public defender to help eliminate the
waste of time and money created by unnecessary docketing of
nonmeritorious claims; it thus facilitates prompt disposition of
meritorious claims. In this way the Minnesota Post Conviction
Remedy, more than any other existing system of post-conviction
relief, provides effective aid to petitioners without needless ex-
pense.29
19. Id. at 2. See also id. at 10.
20. Id. at 10.
21. FEDERAL ACT § 2254(c).
22. FEDERAL ACT § 2254(d).
23. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
24. SECOND REVISED UNIFORM POsT-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT 5
[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT].
25. MIN. STAT. § 590.05; ch. 336, § 5, [1967] Minn. Laws 367.
26. Id. § 590.02(4).
27. Although the statute provides that the clerk shall submit the
petition to the public defender in all cases in which the petitioner is
not represented by counsel or has not waived his right to representa-
tion, presumably the public defender will proceed only in those cases
in which the petitioner is indigent.
28. Letter from C. Paul Jones, Minnesota Public Defender, to all
Minnesota District Court Judges, Aug. 14, 1967.
29. ABA, COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REw---STANDA Us
RELATING TO POsT-CoNwcTION REMEDIEs § 4.4, at 66 (1967) [herein-
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While the Minnesota Act substantially improves the qual-
ity of post-conviction review in Minnesota courts, a few major
shortcomings are noticeable. The most evident defect is the
Act's failure to specifically provide discovery devices. At the
present time only two states3" have complete systems of post-
conviction criminal discovery, although limited discovery is
available in others.31 After examining the experiences of these
states and those of the states without discovery, the American
Bar Association recommended that a system of post-conviction
discovery be developed.32  While relying substantially on the
ABA proposal, the draftsmen of thie Minnesota Act failed to
make explicit their intentions with regard to the availability of
discovery techniques.
The need for some system of discovery is twofold. First, the
applicant is seriously hampered in the preparation and prosecu-
tion of his claim. Like proceedings under rules of civil pro-
cedure,33 proceedings under the Minnesota Post Conviction Rem-
edy will normally contain only one pleading by each party.34
With this minimal pleading requirement it can be seen that, as
in civil proceedings,35 discovery becomes a basic, invaluable tool
after cited as ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA proposals do not advocate
the appointment of counsel in all cases, primarily because of the high
cost to the state in terms of personnel. The cost may not seem so
high, however, when one considers the time saved in court docketing
brought about by cooperation between the public defender and the
courts.
30. Maine, ME. R. CRmE. P. 35(b); Maryland, Mn. R. CRim. P.
BK 40-48 (1965), construed in State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101
(1965), vacated on other grounds sub nann. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66 (1967).
31. See statutes cited note 25 supra.
32. ABA STANDARDS § 4.5, at 67.
33. MINN. R. Civ. P. 7.01 states that there shall be a complaint and
an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a
third-party complaint if permissible and a third-party answer. Thus, in
a two-party action there will be two or possibly three pleadings. No
other pleadings are allowed unless the court so orders.
34. MmNx. STAT. § 590.03; ch. 336, § 3, [1967] Minn. Laws 367,
provides that the petition and an answer to the petition are the only
pleadings necessary unless the court shall so order.
35. The argument might be made that unlike civil complaints,
the petition must allege the facts on which the claim for relief is
grounded. Id. § 590.021. This significant distinction might rebut the
conclusion that discovery devices are necessary for preparation for a
hearing. However, § 590.021 might be interpreted to mean that the
petitioner operates under a conclusion-pleading system much like that of
civil procedure since petition is the onl-y fact pleading. The response,
which may be in the form of an answer or motion, may disclose none




in the attorney's preparation for trial. 6 This is especially true
in a post-conviction situation where many of the facts are
within the peculiar knowledge of the law enforcement agencies,
and where many of the key witnesses were called by the state.
Second, there is a need for a method of summarily dispos-
ing of many petitions.37 Some applications are filed merely to
gain a temporary release . 3  Others request relief on invalid
grounds.3 9 While the Minnesota statute solves these problems
in part,40 the need for quickly disposing of many petitions pro-
vides further justification for the incorporation of discovery de-
vices. A concern over the clogging of the federal courts with
habeas petitions was one of the reasons for the recent amendment
of the Federal Act.4 1 A similar clogging may well occur in Min-
nesota if most petitions are allowed to proceed to the hearing
stage.42  The incorporation of discovery into the Minnesota
statute would facilitate disposition of many applications either
by motion 43 or by cooperation between the court, the prosecution,
and the petitioner.
44
36. The state, having the majority of the evidence as well as the
vast resources of its law enforcement agencies, clearly has an advan-
tage. To remedy this situation some writers have suggested the civil
discovery devices be incorporated in criminal procedure. Fletcher, Pre-
trial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAx. L. REV. 293 (1960);
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56 (1961).
37. Section 590.03 provides that the response by the county attor-
ney may be in the form of a motion. Presumably, this provision con-
templates a motion similar to a motion for summary judgment. MINN.
R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment) operates on the assumption that a
great deal of factual evidence will have been made available at the
time of this motion, by discovery. The judgment on this motion is to
be rendered on "the pleadings, depositions, . . . admissions on file ...
[and] affidavits."
38. See Baker v. United States, 287 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1961); Carvell
v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
39. ABA STANDPDS § 4.2, at 58 (commentary).
40. Section 590.04(3) states that if the petition presents only
issues of law, it is within the discretion of the judge to order the appli-
cant's appearance. However, if the petition raises issues of fact, the
petitioner must be present at the hearing on these issues. Section
590.04(1) provides that if the petition, files, and records conclusively
show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the application may be
dismissed without further proceeding.
41. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
42. It appears that the large number of petitions currently filed
will continue to increase. Letter from C. Paul Jones, Minnesota
Public Defender, to Minnesota District Court Judges, Aug. 14, 1967.
43. See note 40 supra.
44. § 590.02(1) (4). See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The language of the statute suggests that at least some
discovery devices will be available. Section 590.04(3) states that
"In the discretion of the court it may receive evidence in the
form of affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony. . . ." The ad-
missibility of depositions as evidence indicates that at least
limited discovery was contemplated. The draftsmen of the ABA
standards have interpreted identical language in the statutes
of three other states as providing for limited discovery.45 The
Minnesota statute might well be similarly interpreted. More-
over, the needs discussed above support the incorporation of all
the civil discovery procedures.46
Three considerations are likely to become significant when
the Minnesota court is faced with a determination of whether
discovery is available under the Minnesota Post Conviction Rem-
edy: (1) prior judicial interpretation of section 2246 of the Fed-
eral Act concluding discovery was not available, (2) the pos-
sible abuse of the discovery processes by in-prison petitioners,
and (3) the absence of available discovery devices under the
common law procedures of post-conviction relief.
Section 2246 of the Federal Act is similar to section 590.04
(3) 4 7 of the Minnesota Act. In Sullivan v. United States,48 a
federal court, construing section 2246, held that civil discovery
rules did not apply to habeas corpus proceedings 49 and that only
With the availability of discovery, each party will be better prepared
to present his claim and thereby eliminate the necessity of a further
proceeding in a greater number of situations. The reduction of hear-
ings will benefit the state by reducing expenditure of time, money, and
manpower, while simultaneously benefiting the criminal who has a
meritorious claim.
45. ABA STANDARDs § 4.5, at 70 (commentary), interpreting ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-221 (1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.620 (2) (1963).
46. The draftsmen of the Minnesota Act may have assumed that
a petition requesting post-conviction relief was civil in nature, and that,
therefore, the civil devices would be available. Conference with C. Paul
Jones, Minnesota Public Defender and Joseph Livermore, Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, U. of Minn., September 15, 1967, two of the draftsmen of
the Minnesota Post Conviction Remedies Statute.
47. FEDERAL ACT § 2246 reads as follows:
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be
taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge,
by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have
the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or
to file answering affidavits.
MINN. STAT. § 590.04(3) states that, "In the discretion of the court it
may receive evidence in the form of affidavit, deposition, or oral
testimony."
48. 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
49. But see United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th
Cir. 1962); Sullivan v. Dickson, 283 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1960).
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the discovery methods explicitly provided were available. This
was a very narrow interpretation of the section in view of Rule
81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that those rules do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings ex-
cept to the extent that practice is not set forth in the statutes
of the United States. Since the Minnesota law makes no provi-
sion for the use of depositions after the admission of affidavits,50
the Sullivan interpretation of section 2246 should not influence
the Minnesota court.
The possibility of abuse of the discovery procedure5 ' should
not discourage the incorporation of civil discovery techniques.
If the civil discovery devices are made available no greater
problems of abuse should be encountered than those presented
in civil proceedings. Since discovery could not be initiated with-
in twenty days of the filing of his petition,52 the applicant will
generally be represented by counsel53 before discovery is avail-
able. In the few cases in which the petitioner waives his right
to counsel,5 4 abuse could be controlled by Minnesota Rule 30.02
which provides that the court may make any order justice
requires for the protection of the parties, including an order
that discovery not be made. If only limited discovery were
made available as in those cases where the court has granted per-
mission,55 the problem would be negated.56
The final argument which might be made against the incor-
poration of discovery is that Minnesota has no common law prec-
edent for the use of discovery in post-conviction proceedings. 57
50. See note 47 supra.
51. Sullivan v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
52. MwN. R. Civ. P. 26.01.
53. The applicant ordinarily will be represented either by private
counsel or by the public defender. See notes 30-33 supra and accom-
panying text.
54. See Mnu. STAT. § 590.02(3); ch. 336, § 2(3), [1967] Minn. Laws
367.
55. See ABA STANDADS § 4.5, at 71 (commentary).
56. ABA STA=DArDs § 4.5 suggests a fourth problem not dealt
with in this Comment, i.e., the constitutional limitations upon dis-
covery directed at the applicant. However, it is pointed out that since
the prisoner is the moving party, some of the problems of compulsory
self-incrimination are removed. Under a limited system of discovery,
further constitutional problems might be avoided before permission to
take the applicant's deposition was granted. If the full panoply of
civil discovery were made available, constitutional problems might be
raised on hearing of a motion made under MixN. R. Civ. P. 30.02.
57. See, e.g., MiNN. R. Civ. P. 81.01, which provides that proceedings
in which a writ of habeas corpus is sought shall be exempted from the
rules of civil procedure in so far as habeas proceedings are inconsistent
1968]
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This, however, is not tenable, for the Post Conviction Remedy
specifically provides that it is to supersede all other remedies; it
is an exclusive method of relief.58 Moreover, being remedial, it
should be liberally construed to best satisfy the needs giving rise
to its adoption. If these needs are to be satisfied," section
590.04(3) should be interpreted to make discovery devices avail-
able.
A second major shortcoming of the Act is its failure to clear-
ly indicate the quantum of proof which the petitioners must
provide before courts must grant relief. Section 590.04(3),
which codifies previous habeas corpus requirements, ° provides
that "[U]nless otherwise ordered by the court the burden of
proof of the facts alleged in the petition shall be upon the
petitioner to establish such facts by a fair preponderance of the
evidence." This language must be interpreted with due consid-
eration given to the fact that at some point the factual deter-
minations of the state courts may be subjected to review"' by
federal courts, thereby defeating a major purpose of the post-
conviction remedy.62  Subject to this limitation, however, it
seems clear from this provision that a court in its discretion
may change the amount of proof necessary for petitioner to gain
relief, even to the extent of placing upon the state the burden to
show why he should be denied relief.
The burden and quantum of proof in a given case arising
under the Minnesota Post Conviction Remedy should be a func-
tion of the substantive law governing the allegations of the
petition.63 If the petitioner alleges that his confession was in-
voluntarily obtained, it would seem that the evidence pre-
sented must show, to a "moral certainty," that the confession
was voluntary.6 4 If the petition alleges that there was discrimi-
or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the civil
rules.
58. MIn. STAT. § 590.01(2); ch. 336, § 1(2), [1967] Mlinn. Laws 367.
59. See notes 11-16 & 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
60. E.g., State ex rel. Harris v. Tahash, 353 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1965).
61. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963), the Court stated,
"If the state trial judge has made serious procedural errors ... in
such things as the burden of proof, a federal hearing is required." Ar-
guably, a similar error made in a post-conviction hearing would ren-
der the procedure inadequate and the absence of a full and fair
hearing would eliminate the presumption of correctness. See note 22
supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
63. See ABA STANDARDS § 4.6, at 73 (commentary).
64. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), requiring that a
pre-trial hearing be conducted on the voluntariness issue. At that
hearing the trial judge must make a "reliable determination" of the
[Vol. 52:698
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nation in the selection of the jury, it should fall upon the peti-
tioner to establish at least a prima facie case of discrimination.6 5
The reasons behind the allocation of the burden at the original
trial 6 seem equally compelling in a post-conviction hearing on
allegations not previously determined.6
However, a counterargument exists. Since the post-con-
viction hearing will generally take place long after the original
trial, evidence will often be difficult to ascertain. Thus, if the
allocation of the burden of proof at the post-conviction hearing
is to remain as it rested at the trial, many petitioners who were
properly convicted may be freed merely because the state can-
not now, as it had at that time, produce sufficient evidence to
meet its burden of proof.08 In those cases the burden must be
issue. The Minnesota court has held that when a hearing is granted
through a post-conviction proceeding -the evidence must satisfy the
trial judge to "a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that the
confession was voluntarily given." State v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 270,
143 N.W.2d 75, 79 (1966).
65. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), and Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), indicating that the defendant (petitioner)
must establish a prima facie case before it falls to the state merely to
rebut that allegation.
66. For example, the state must establish the guilt of an indicted
criminal beyond a reasonable doubt because the quantum and burden
of proof ought to be commensurate with the sanction imposed. State
v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1965). This reasoning applies
equally well when the question is whether those sanctions which have
been placed upon a man ought to be continued.
67. If all prior adjudications of factual basis of the matter raised
in the petition are given a res judicata effect with respect to the peti-
tion only those matters not previously determined and those allegations
based upon new grounds will remain for the consideration of the post-
conviction court. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
68. The situation which New York now faces in the area of invol-
untary confessions illustrates this problem. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964), held unconstitutional New York procedures used to deter-
mine whether a confession was voluntarily obtained. In People v.
Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965), the
New York Court of Appeals held that petitioners are entitled to a
habeas hearing if the Denno standard was not complied with at trial.
In People v. Leonti, 18 N.Y.2d 384, 222 N.E.2d 591, 275 N.Y.S.2d 825
(1966), it was held that at such a hearing, the state must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Thus, if a
defendant convicted in 1945 were to challenge his conviction today on
the grounds that his confession was involuntarily obtained, the state
would face an insurmountable obstacle. Many witnesses may have
died and the memory of many others would be clouded, and in many
circumstances no record would be available to refresh those memo-
ries. To require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
confession was voluntary would virtually insure that the defendant
would be entitled to go free. This argument may, however, be tem-
pered as the constitutional rights of criminals become more settled.
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shifted to the petitioner.69 This is not unfair. The wording of
the statute70 does not induce petitioner to believe that the burden
will not be so shifted. Thus, the ambiguity of section 590.04(3)
can be used both to pursue the irnerest of consistency in the
majority of cases and to allow the subrogation of that interest
to the practical considerations of the administration of justice
in other cases.
The Minnesota Post Conviction Remedy is an adequate re-
sponse to the federal government's admonitions to the states to
formulate an orderly system of post-conviction relief. Assist-
ance of counsel is ensured to all petitioners. The high degree
of cooperation between petitioner's counsel and the court contem-
plated by the system should serve the ends of justice. Assum-
ing that the res judicata effect presently ascribed to prior peti-
tions71 is extended to include all prior adjudications of a given
issue 7 2 greater time will be made available for consideration of
the more meritorious claims. In the end, however, the effective-
ness of the Act will be determined by the interpretation given
69. It is submitted that the most obvious alternative-i.e., a timeli-
ness doctrine-would not resolve the problem. A doctrine such as this
is based on the notion that the defendant must bring his action within
a reasonable time from the date of the availability of the alleged grounds.
If the Supreme Court were to decide twenty years after a conviction
that some procedure violated the defendant's constitutional rights, the
defendant might file his petition twenty-one years from the date of
his conviction and presumably not have violated the timeliness doc-
trine. However, the twenty-one year old evidence would be none-
theless stale.
70. "Unless otherwise ordered by the court the burden of proof
of the facts alleged in the petition shall be upon the petitioner to es-
tablish such facts by a preponderance of the evidence." MNN. STAT.
§ 590.04(3).
71. Federal experience conclusively indicates there will be few
claims worthy of consideration. Of 4,843 habeas petitions filed in 1965,
95% of these were without merit. S. RF. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1966).
72. The Supreme Court has recognized the sufficiency of an eviden-
tiary hearing conducted by the convictilng court in the course of the
original trial. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (dicta). The
Minnesota court has made a similar statement. State ex rel. Roy v.
Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1967). Inasmuch as Roy may be viewed
as a preview to the Minnesota court's interpretation of the Post Con-
viction Remedy, see note 10 supra, the statement takes on added
significance.
Under the Federal Act any finding by a state court after a full and
fair hearing is presumed correct and is accepted as final by the fed-
eral courts unless the applicant can prove that the state determination
failed to provide a full and fair hearing on his claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (1965), as amended, (Supp. I1, 1966), for the full text of what
the state prisoner must specifically prove in a federal habeas proceed-
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